

BOOK REVIEW

Gabriela Horoşanu. 2014. *NATO-EU: A Smarter Collaboration*, Bucharest, Tritonic Publishing House, 194 pages, ISBN: 978-606-8571-41-6.

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Part of a larger PhD dissertation defended in 2013, Gabriela-Cornelia Horoşanu's book analyses the ways in which NATO and the European Union cooperate in Kosovo and Afghanistan through their missions on the ground, and makes recommendations for better defence planning and capability development. Her fieldwork in Kosovo which occasioned direct observation of both EULEX and KFOR and then later her work within NATO's Emerging Security Challenges Division provide the book with both an academic's and a practitioner's perspective.

The main explicit assumption of the book is that security in the new world order can only be achieved through collective action in regional and global institutional frameworks. This takes place in the so-called liberal order 3.0 as presented by John Ikenberry (Ikenberry 2009), the elements of which are summarized by the author: a post-Westphalian state sovereignty, with increased economic and security interdependence, a post-hegemonic hierarchy (multi-polar), the setting of a universal goal and an extensive cooperation of a comprehensive network-based system of rules (p. 39). In this type of order, the international community plays an increasing role in the functioning of the global system, specifically in the area of security, which thus becomes a public good, "artificially created through cooperation" (p. 16). Neo-liberal institutionalism, together with collective action theory and rational choice are the theoretical underpinnings of this book, presented in detail in the first chapter.

Judging by the introduction, one could think that the main implicit assumption of this book (which the author does not state) is the fact that the EU is a collective security provider mostly through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. This entails, in its turn, a

parallel discussion on how the EU - through its CSDP missions more specifically - actually contributes to international security and how the same missions help promote the liberal order (through rule of law promotion, security sector reform, peace-building, democracy promotion, etc.). It seems that this discussion fell beyond the scope of the book and the author based her analysis on the premise that the European Union *does* count as a security provider in the liberal order.

The second chapter deals with the NATO-EU "strategic partnership", the success of which is questioned in light of both the existing legal deadlock and difficulties in practice. The author highlights early on the main constraints on the contractual collaboration between the two organisations, pointing to the different views among some allies and the United States concerning the role of an autonomous defence of the EU on the one hand and the relations between Turkey and the EU on the other hand; whilst the first issue seems to evolve in a positive manner, no solution has been found yet for the second one. The compromise would be, in the author's view, to accommodate Turkey and give it "some kind of involvement in CSDP, at least a similar status to the one it had in the Western European Union" (p. 46).

The more practical aspects which affect the NATO-EU cooperation refer to a lack of investment and declining defence budgets and military spending in Europe, with a significant impact on capability development. The importance of the latter cannot be overemphasized as it could ultimately enhance the collaboration between NATO and the EU. The author could have included at this point a discussion on the nature of the EU's power and the extent to which the development of military capabilities affects the EU's predominantly civilian character. The literature abounds in scholarly labels for the type of power that the EU embodies, from "civilian power Europe" (Duchêne 1972) to "normative power Europe" (Manners 2002), with few (neo)realist attempts to look behind the myth of "civilian power by default" (Hyde-Price 2006) or to argue downright for endowing the EU with "the power of war" (van Ham 2010).

Beyond academic debates though, during the last years, the reality has been that defence budgets are shrinking in Europe as the consequence of the economic and financial crisis, and public opinion concerns regarding a militarised CSDP are positioned somewhere in the background. However, with armed conflict occurring in both Ukraine and the Middle East, the debate on the need for a potential "European army" or at least acquiring more military capabilities by EU members could resurge once again. Even Ian

Manners himself later reconsidered his argument, admitting that, in the end, “the militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power, if critical reflection characterized the process” (Manners 2007, 15). In other words, the EU could both enhance its military capabilities and maintain its moral standing in the world, as long as it achieves the former according to a strategy and through a reflective process.

Gabriela Horoşanu also analyses briefly the changes in the EU’s external profile in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, in particular the solidarity and mutual defence clauses, the permanent structure cooperation and update of the Petersberg (CSDP) tasks. She argues that the added value of implementing the permanent structured cooperation “is real for the EU, NATO, national governments and taxpayers alike” (p. 55) and explores it across seven dimensions: inclusiveness, coordination, cost-effectiveness, assessment, significant military contributions and “boots on the ground” (pp. 55-56).

At the book’s core, the author takes a close look at the EU and NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan and assesses their collaboration on the ground, by also using semi-structured interviews and direct observation (third chapter). The main reasons for criticising the results of the NATO-EU cooperation are the “learning by doing” character of these operations and the lack of preparedness of both NATO and the EU for a new type of war and dealing with its aftermath. The solutions that the author suggests are: a new/optimised defence planning process, better intelligence sharing, good practices sharing and coordination of policies. Also, she advocates for the so-called reverse Berlin Plus arrangement which would allow NATO’s access to the EU’s capabilities for civilian crisis management.

More specifically, in the case of Kosovo she advocates for “an efficient cooperation at all levels (political, strategic, operational and tactical) of all stakeholders”, together with joint training and exercises among EULEX, KFOR (and Kosovo Police), a political/strategic framework for cooperation as a good umbrella for tactical cooperation on the ground and the spill-over of lower level cooperation to cooperation mechanisms at the top level, while also maintaining local ownership for the security environment as much as possible (pp. 75-76). In more general terms, she highlights three main lessons learned from 13 years of state-building efforts in Kosovo. First, state-building in post-conflict countries is “a tough political exercise, requiring fundamental political decisions regarding the distribution of power and resources” (p. 73). Hence, the neutral stance of intervening parties cannot be applied to the letter, but as

international state-building missions affect the local political order, they have to be well thought over, including sound exit strategies. Second, international actors intervening in post-conflict situations need to “realistic about what socio-political transformations they can actually achieve” (p. 74). In the case of Kosovo, despite the huge resources invested, the policies of external donors remain largely inefficient and incapable of actually shaping the state-building process. Third, a (future) state built according to the international institutions’ focus on stability will become an unbalanced one dominated by a powerful executive and weak legislative, especially if the control of the former belongs to them (as with the International Civilian Office and EULEX in Kosovo), thus endangering the democracy they were trying to build (p. 74).

Fundamentally, in the author’s view, what was at stake in the two cases – Kosovo and Afghanistan – was the extent to which NATO can rely on other international actors – like the EU – for counterinsurgency and post-conflict stabilisation efforts, undertaken in the context of asymmetric threats and out-of-area operations. Of course, the fact that NATO and the EU share 22 member states should make it easier to have a fruitful, or using the author’s own words, a “smarter” collaboration. But overlapping membership is not enough and efficient cooperation mechanisms are needed.

The next two chapters focus on NATO, its assessment of emerging security challenges and the author’s own model for the optimisation of the decision-making process in the Alliance. Finally, her conclusion is that NATO is a collective security brand which determines the Member States to act towards the common good (p. 181). Some states are lagging behind in fulfilling their commitments, but the security guarantee is technically beyond any doubt. We are used to talking about multi-speed Europe, but there is a similar situation in NATO. What differentiates the two organisations from this perspective is obviously the nature of their bond and the scope of the contractual relation established among the member states. Whilst there are some who argue that after the Lisbon treaty and the introduction of the solidarity and mutual defence clauses the EU is turning into a military alliance, NATO remains the go-to authority for security and defence matters for the time being. However, a smarter collaboration between the two could decide the future of the liberal order, as implemented in post-conflict stabilisation contexts and fragile states.

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