

GAMBLING AT HIGH STAKES: THE ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE PORTFOLIOS IN COALITION GOVERNMENTS. CASE STUDY ON POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA

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Abstract

The literature on portfolio allocation generally recognizes proportionality as the norm for distributing cabinet seats in coalition governments. However, more recent studies have been increasingly concerned with the value or salience of different ministerial portfolios, as an access to explaining deviations from the proportionality norm. Although significant progress has been made in the study of coalition governments and portfolio allocation in Eastern Europe, there is still a gap between the data and research available for this region, compared to Western Europe.

The article aims to fill a part of this gap by conducting a case study on portfolio allocation in post-communist Romania, particularly focused on the preference for defense and foreign affairs portfolios. Thus, I study the data from 22 coalition governments in Romania, between 1992 and 2020. The article examines the assertion that, while proportionality remains the norm for Romanian coalition governments, the second most important coalition partner is regularly rewarded with either the defense or foreign affairs ministry. In the end, I explore new opportunities for further research based on the findings, and future contributions to the debate on the allocation of foreign affairs and defense portfolios in Eastern Europe.

Keywords

Coalition government; portfolio salience; proportionality; foreign affairs and defense portfolios.

1.INTRODUCTION

“...distributing accountability at the level of government, locally and within other executive structures derives directly from the weight each party has, following the popular vote...Respecting this proportionality is the only democratic way in which their own electorate can be represented, and its interests can and must be promoted. Therefore, this is not about bargaining, but following some principles.” (Press release following the coalition government meeting between the Democratic Convention of Romania, the Social-Democratic Union and the Democratic Union of Hungarians, April, 23, 1997)

Following the 1996 elections in Romania, which resulted in the first alternation of power after the fall of communism and in the first coalition government with multiple parties of similar size, a previously rarely used word in the domain of politics became all too familiar for the media and the public opinion: “algorithm”. Coalition governments were not new per se in postcommunist Romania, but the type of coalition cabinet emerging from the 1996 elections, and the ongoing negotiations between political parties in distributing offices and then in implementing policies was rather uncharted territory. Before the 1996 elections, the government had been dominated by one major left-wing party, initially named the National Salvation Front, then Social Democracy Party of Romania, only to become later the Social Democratic Party (PSD). The size of the party allowed it to form by itself a viable cabinet, both after the 1990 elections, when it gained a large majority, and after the 1992 election. For a part of the 1992-1996 term, the social-democrats decided to include another small party in the cabinet. Nevertheless, their survival in office had never actually been in question or depended on extensive negotiations within a coalition.

Under these circumstances, it was only after 1996 that one of the most constant features of multi-party democratic systems – coalition governments – came to be on full display in the newly emerging Romanian democracy. In their extensive work on the early years of transition in Romania, Pavel and Huiu noted, citing research interviews with political leaders at the time, that the so-called “algorithm” replaced the debates on policy priorities, and became a pervasive source of tensions inside the coalition, as well as a major reason for criticism from the media. In actuality though, the “algorithm” was nothing else than the answer to the question „who gets what”, and the search for ensuring proportionality between the number of portfolios and executive offices, and the contribution of each political party to the majority parliamentary coalition. Far from being aberrant or concerning, this was a feature of a “pluralist normality” (Pavel and Huiu 2003, 335), which the Western multi-party system democracies had been experiencing for decades, and Romania was newly discovering.

One empirical observation of the early coalition governments was the emphasis attributed to the foreign affairs and defense portfolios. One early practice in the first years of transition in Romania was to define one or more portfolios as “state ministries”, as an indication of their superior political and symbolic weight in the cabinet, and the priority assigned to those policy areas. As Romania was emerging from 50 years of communism, the aspiration of joining the Western political and security structures, in particular NATO and the European Union, became almost immediately a national priority. Being part of the North-Atlantic and European constructs became Romania’s national project, which channeled unprecedented political efforts, social energies, and public enthusiasm. There were, thus, high stakes, in holding the portfolios responsible for the management of these particular national objectives.

Given such high stakes, another empirical observation points to the prominence of those who held the foreign affairs and defense portfolios. Among them, one can find a combination of profiles ranging from party presidents and vice-presidents to independent public figures and senior career officials with experience in foreign service or military.

Against this background, the current article offers a case study on Romania - an overview on the portfolio allocation in post-communist Romania - by

addressing first its proportionality, and, inside of it, the distribution of foreign affairs and defense portfolios.

Thus, it examines the following hypothesis: *While proportionality remains the norm in coalition governments in post-communist Romania, the second most important coalition partner is more likely to get either the foreign affairs or defense ministry.*

After reviewing the relevant literature pertaining to this research, I provide methodological and conceptual clarifications in the first part of the article. The second part is dedicated to presenting and analyzing the data, to respond to the above questions. Finally, I offer some conclusions and propose directions for future research, that could further contribute to the study of coalition governments in Eastern Europe.

2.LITERATURE REVIEW

Coalition governments are one of the most prominent features of democratic life in multi-party systems. For more than half of century, generations of scholars have developed extensive both quantitative and qualitative research aiming to explain, understand and furthermore predict what coalitions are more likely to form and how their life cycle unfolds.

Gamson's proportionality norm (Gamson 1961) offers one of the earliest and most durable points of reference in how coalitions distribute portfolios between party members. It provides a logical foundation, empirically verifiable, for portfolio allocation, as each party is expected to receive a number of portfolios proportional to its number of parliamentary seats. While considered the "dominant regularity in portfolio allocation" (Verzichelli 2010, 239), the proportionality norm rather allows for a quantitative approach, in which portfolios are related to as equal. However, coalition governments do not form in a vacuum, but within an institutional framework and a given political context, that can shape the preferences and bargaining power of political actors. Moreover, not all portfolios are the same. On a pure proportionality logic, parties would be indifferent to what portfolios they get, as long as they get the appropriate number, consistent with their contribution to the legislative power

of the coalition. That is not the case. While there are a number of variables that can account for deviations from the norm (Verzichelli 2010), the value or salience of different portfolios is probably the most critical. Following the seminal evidence-based research conducted by Druckman and Warwick (Warwick and Druckman 2001), measuring portfolio salience has become from a “missing piece” (Druckman and Warwick 2005) one of the most challenging, contested (Druckman and Roberts 2008) and relevant issues in coalition research.

For political, strategic, and ideological reasons, different parties prioritize specific portfolios in the coalition bargaining process (Budge and Laver 1986). Similarly, the ability of some portfolios to increase the electoral prospects of a party – which the coalition literature labels as “redistributive” portfolios – may render them more coveted than others, with foreign affairs and defense among them. (Druckman and Roberts 2008, 104)

In their extensive research on 14 Western European democracies, Warwick and Druckman (Warwick and Druckman 2001) concluded that the offices of prime-minister, as well as finance, defense, interior, foreign affairs, and agriculture portfolios are more salient than the average other ministry. Although in Western Europe these portfolios are not more valuable than the next tier of six ministries, they are in Eastern Europe. This was revealed in 2008 by Druckman and Roberts (Druckman and Roberts 2008), who extended, for the first time, the study on portfolio salience with data from 12 Eastern European countries. Their overall conclusion was “the salience of portfolios is quite similar between Eastern and Western Europe”, with some unexpected differences, however.

While the foreign affairs ministry remains on average the third most valuable portfolio, Druckman and Roberts anticipated a lower salience of defense ministries. The data infirmed their hypothesis. In fact, they discovered the Eastern European countries value the defense portfolio to a higher degree than the Western democracies. The “prestige” gained by the military following NATO membership could account for such a result. Within their data, Romania

stands out as assigning higher value both to Foreign Affairs and Defense portfolios than any other Eastern European country.¹

Despite the progress made in covering Eastern Europe, the region has remained under-researched and underrepresented in coalition theory. In 2019, a group of scholars led by Torbjorn Bergman, Gabriela Ilonszki and Wolfgang Muller set out to fill what they considered the “greatest gap” in coalition research (Bergman, Ilonszki and Muller 2019), by covering the entire life cycle of coalition governments in Central and Eastern Europe. Due to their effort, more recent extensive data on this region is now available. However, there is still much room for further research regarding portfolio salience in Eastern Europe and what motivates parties to request as payoff some ministries rather the others. Laurențiu Ștefan observes that in Romania the distribution of portfolios approximately followed the proportionality norm overall, with some cabinets being more unbalanced than others. (Ștefan 2019, 419-420).

The challenge is now in bridging and updating the data, as well as deepening the understanding not only on who gets what in coalition governments, but also why. Inside of this broader framework, the foreign affairs portfolio has gained particular interest from scholars recently, in an attempt both to explain its salience and to predict what coalition partner is more likely to be attributed to. Thus, Kai Opperman and Klaus Brummer (Oppermann and Brummer 2020) discovered in their study on 18 European countries that only a “complex interaction of conditions” can account for the junior coalition partner receiving the foreign affairs portfolio. While they could not identify with certainty one specific set of explanatory conditions, their research pointed to the conclusion that either the relative size of the junior partner (more specifically the junior partner having a similar size with the senior partner) or the salience it attaches to foreign policy, combined with the record of having led this ministry before, are relevant for junior partners being entrusted with the foreign policy portfolio in coalitions.

¹ The average portfolio rating for foreign affairs is 1.45, and for defense 1.08. In the study conducted by Druckman and Roberts Romania scored 1.89 for foreign affairs, higher than any other portfolio with the exception of prime minister, and 1.51 for defense.

What is particularly enticing about the study of foreign policy portfolio allocation is the intersection between the coalition literature and foreign policy analysis in explaining how the internal political dynamic reflects on foreign policy decision making. Both the coalition and the foreign policy analysis literature have a newly increased interest in explaining the impact of coalition arrangements on foreign policy decision making and the allocation of foreign affairs portfolios in coalition governments. (Oppermann, Brummer and Willigen, *Coalition Governance and Foreign Policy Decision Making* 2017).

It is beyond the purpose of this article to provide extensive research on portfolio allocation in Romania or fully explain the saliency of foreign affairs and defense portfolios. This article is rather taking on the challenge to extend the existing research, by incorporating more data from a single country setting – Romania, and including the allocation of another high-profile ministry – defense, besides the more research foreign affairs one.

3.METHODOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This article analyses the Romanian coalition cabinets from 1992, the first post-communist elections organized under a new Constitution and starting a 4 years electoral cycle, to the most recent completed electoral cycle (2020). A coalition includes at least two political parties (Muller, Bergman and Strom 2010, 6), regardless of their size, and the single party or non-party cabinets are not included in this study. In defining what constitutes a new cabinet, I am following the criteria established by the existing literature on coalitions: elections, a change in prime minister's office, a change in the political structure of the cabinet (Muller, Bergman and Strom 2010, 6). In addition, I am also considering the existence of a confidence vote in the Parliament, following the approach proposed by Laurentiu Stefan. According to his research, the ultimate indicator for a new government within the Romanian context is the existence of a confidence vote in the Parliament. (Stefan, *Romania: 30 de guverne in 30 de ani (decembrie 1989 - august 2019)* 2019, 92).

However, in practice, the line of demarcation between cabinets proved to be rather fluid especially in the early years of transition. Prior to 2003, the Romanian Constitution did not prescribe explicitly the requirement for a confidence vote following any change in the party composition of the cabinet. Based on a rather lax understanding of what it meant to operate a change in the political structure of the cabinet, in six cases (Stefan, Romania: 30 de guverne in 30 de ani (decembrie 1989 - august 2019) 2019, 96) prime ministers did not request for a confidence vote, even though one junior partner either left or joined the cabinet. In two other cases, although the cabinets went through a confidence vote in the parliament following a reshuffle, the scholars still dispute whether the political structure was indeed altered and, consequently, whether these should be considered as new cabinets.

Given the complexity of this matter, I am counting as new any cabinet following at least one of the above four criteria: elections, a change in the prime minister's office, a change in the party composition/ political structure, a confidence vote in the parliament.

Another aspect to be clarified stems from the extensive use of pre-electoral alliances in post-communist Romania. There was no election without at least one such alliance between two or more political parties. However, in the post-electoral setting political parties organized themselves in separate parliamentary groups, whenever the number of parliamentary seats allowed them to, and operated rather as individual actors in negotiating portfolios and executive offices.

The practice of forming pre-electoral alliances, correlated to the fragmentation of the party system, allowed even minor political parties, sometimes rated by opinion polls below the electoral threshold, to gain parliamentary and governmental representation. Therefore, when addressing the portfolio allocation, I am counting all political parties participating in a coalition government as distinct, irrespective of the way they gained seats in the parliament - through an alliance or independently.

To answer the first research hypothesis regarding the proportionality of the Romanian coalition cabinets I will be using the disproportionality index of

portfolio allocation proposed by Lucca Verziquelli (Verzichelli 2010), based on the following formula.

$$D = \sum | (m_i/tm) - (s_i/cs) |$$

In this case, “D” is the disproportionality index, “m” stands for “ministry positions”, “i” represents a political party, while “tm” the total number of members of a cabinet. Besides the ministerial portfolios, on various occasions cabinets included as members deputy prime ministers with or without portfolios, ministers delegate, and even state secretaries or other governmental officials raised to the status of cabinet member to elevate the political weight of their office. For example, after the 1996 elections, the first cabinet led by prime minister Victor Ciorbea included as members no less than 3 state secretaries from the Finance, Defense and Industry and Commerce Ministries. Another example is the General Secretary of the Government whose status varied over time from attending the cabinet meetings without being part of the cabinet to being a full member. While I am including all these positions in the membership of a government, I am excluding from the calculation of disproportionality non-partisan, independent ministries.

The index itself ranges from 0, which equals perfect proportionality, to 1 as an indication of complete disproportionality. Verzichelli’s model illustrates both an unweighted version of the index, in which all portfolios are equal, and a weighted one, in which the prime minister's position counts as double. For this article, I am using the unweighted version, which does not differentiate between the prime minister and the rest of the portfolios.

The proportionality rule comes with a caveat, requiring the largest party to concede to its smaller partners at least one of the prominent ministries. (Oppermann and Brummer 2020). Foreign policy and defense, especially in the post-communist context, seemed to have been less divisive issues therefore they could easily go to a party that does not lead the government. To look at the preferences of political parties for defense and foreign affairs ministries, in terms of what party gets them, I am proposing a quantitative approach. Furthermore, I

will provide a contextual analysis of the data that could allow for a deeper understanding of how party preferences were shaped.

Besides my own research, I am using the database on coalition governance in Central and Eastern Europe, provided by the European Representative Democracy Data Archive (ERDDA).


Beyond proportionality

Hypothesis: While proportionality remains the norm in coalition governments in post-communist Romania, the second most important coalition partner is more likely to get either the foreign affairs or defense ministry.

To verify the validity of this hypothesis, the article explores first the evidence regarding proportionality and then the allocation of foreign affairs and defense cabinet positions, in quantitative terms. Nevertheless, the context is decisive and a deeper dive into some contextual elements can shed further light on the numbers themselves.

The graph below displays the disproportionality index for the portfolio allocation in 22 coalition cabinets analyzed in this study.

Graph 1



The average disproportionality of portfolio allocation for Romanian coalitions between 1992 and 2020 is 0.14, very much in line with the average of the Western European democracies¹. One look beyond such average and the index itself reveals however a more nuanced picture at the extremes of the range.

The most disproportionate cabinets (Ungureanu and Ponta 1) were both formed in the same year, 2012, under particular circumstances, and were short-lived. At the same time, they both were caused by a change in the prime minister's office and, in both cases, the disproportionality worked in favor of the junior coalition partner or partners, albeit for different reasons. In February 2012, then prime

¹ The average unweighted disproportionality in Verzichelli's study was 0.10.

minister Emil Boc resigned under increasing social and political pressure¹, and an independent prime minister was appointed in his place, Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu, a former career diplomat, and foreign affairs minister. Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu was endorsed and politically supported by the Liberal Democratic Party (PDL) and president Traian Basescu. Confronted with a volatile political climate and a fragile majority, in the face of an increasingly stronger and united opposition, the newly formed cabinet favored junior partners and compensated them with a higher proportion of cabinet position than their parliamentary strengths would have justified. Thus, the senior coalition partner – PDL – held only 60% of the portfolios despite its 74% contribution to the parliamentary strengths of the government. On the other hand, the second most important party, the Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania (UDMR), was awarded 27% of the cabinet positions for its 14% quota of parliamentary seats. The third coalition party, the National Union for the Progress of Romania (UNPR) received for its 12% of seats 13% of the portfolios, including both foreign affairs and defense ministries, and the letter was attributed to the president of the party (see Annex 1). The fragility of this cabinet, which may account for its higher degree of disproportionality, resulted in a very short life cycle. After less than three months, Ungureanu government failed to pass a non-confidence vote in the Parliament (expressed in the Romanian system through a censorship motion) and was removed from office.²

In May 2012, a new government was formed, led by Victor Ponta, president of the Social Democratic Party. The first Ponta cabinet has been the most disproportionate yet, but for a different reason than the cabinet it had just replaced. In negotiating a political alliance of the unified opposition – the Social Liberal Union, meant to defeat the incumbent party and president, the social-

¹ In February 2012, a series of protests erupted in Romania. Prime minister Emil Boc resigned “to release the tension in the country’s political and social situation.” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/06/romania-pm-cabinet-resign>.

² The censorship motion passed on April 27, 2012, with 235 votes, four more than the threshold required. <https://www.cnn.com/2012/04/27/world/europe/romania-government-collapse>

democrats agreed to an equal representation in a future cabinet with the National Liberal Party and its smaller ally, the Conservative Party.¹ Thus, following the successful censorship motion against the Ungureanu cabinet, when Victor Ponta was called to form a new government, the liberals and social democrats ended up with equal shares of portfolios, although the Social Democratic Party had twice as many parliamentary seats as the National Liberal Party. This was considered a strategic victory for the liberals at that time, but it eventually lasted only a few more months, until the proximate parliamentary elections, in December 2012. While the Social Liberal Union won the elections in a landslide and Victor Ponta remained prime minister, the post-electoral bargaining process in the coalition led to a different outcome of the portfolio allocation and to a new government with a distinct structure. Thus, the second Ponta cabinet became one of the most proportional ones in the post-communist history of coalition governments, with the social democrats holding 52% of the portfolios against a 53% weight in the parliamentary coalition supporting the government, and the liberals being awarded 37% of the cabinet members against 38% of parliamentary strength.

This leads us to take a deeper look at the other end of the index, to investigate the cabinets closest to perfect proportionality and the context in which they were created and operated.

Thus, 3 of the 4 most proportionate cabinets were negotiated immediately after parliamentary elections (in 2008 – Boc 1, in 2012 - Ponta 2, in 2004 - Tariceanu 1), while Ponta 4 was caused by the withdrawal from a government of a junior partner, following the loss of presidential elections for prime minister Ponta. In fact, all coalition cabinets formed following parliamentary elections in the last two decades, regardless their numerical or ideological composition, are in the

¹ According to the provisions of Chapter VII of the Social Liberal Union Constitutive Act, the two components of the alliance (PSD and PNL+PC) would be equally represented in the government, without considering the prime minister office. https://media.hotnews.ro/media_server1/document-2011-02-4-8272317-0-protocol-psd-pnl.pdf

top ten most proportionate (Nastase 1 in 2000, Tariceanu 1 in 2004, Boc 1 in 2008, Ponta 2 in 2012 and Grindeanu in 2016).


In 2008, the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party were very close to mathematical equality, as the difference between them was less than 1%. The social democrats won the most votes, however, the democrat liberals gained 8 seats more in the Parliaments. As PSD and PDL formed the new government, each having half of the portfolios was the logical distribution.

Inside this pursuit of proportionality, some portfolios are preferred over the others by different political parties. Nevertheless, the data below contradicts the hypothesis that the second in size coalition partner is likely to receive the foreign affairs or defense ministry. Out of the 22 coalitions, this was the case in less than half. The second coalition partner received foreign affairs in 10 cases, a third party in 2 cases, while in other two instances the ministers joined the office as independents, although having the support of a political party. (see Graph 2). The picture is even more striking when it comes to defense ministries, preferred by the main party of a coalition in half of the cases. In only 8 cabinets the junior coalition partner held both offices. (See Graph 3)


The number is smaller if we look at coalition cycles and specific parties. Between 1996 and 2000, in the successive cabinets coalesced around the Democratic Convention and the Social Democratic Union, the Democratic Party held the foreign affairs and defense ministries for the entire duration of this cycle, except for a short period of two months when it temporarily left the government. Between 2008 and 2012, the National Union for Romania's Progress (UNPR), the third party in size, claimed these portfolios when participating in Boc and Ungureanu cabinets, and the National Liberal Party received them as part of the coalition bargaining with the social democrats in the first Ponta cabinet, whose particular circumstances were referenced above.

Later on, UNPR preferred a deputy prime minister position, presiding over national security and defense matters, rather than the ministerial position itself, while the liberals gave up both portfolios after the 2012 elections preferring a deputy prime minister position for their finance minister, as well as the internal affairs portfolio.

Graph 2



Graph 3



4. CONCLUSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The article examined data from 22 coalition governments in post-communist Romania to determine the validity of one hypothesis. This was partially contradicted by our findings. In the first instance, the assertion that proportionality is the overall principle in coalition bargaining and portfolio allocation in Romania was verified. The index calculated for Romania shows similarities with the Western European average, being closer to perfect proportionality than to complete disproportionality.

At the same time, a closer look to the particularities of different coalitions' distribution on the proportionality index scale revealed that the more disproportionate cabinets were formed under rather unusual circumstances. On the other hand, as a more recent tendency, cabinets formed immediately after the parliamentary elections displayed a higher degree of proportionality. Thus, a possible direction for further qualitative research could be to examine under what conditions Romanian political parties and party leaders were or may be more willing to compromise at the expense of proportional representation in the government, and what motivates them.

Against the background of proportionality, the junior partners are not necessarily rewarded with foreign affairs and defense ministries, as enounced in the hypothesis. There is no distinguishable rule or pattern to predict with certainty that either of these portfolios or both would go to a different party than the main coalition party. On the contrary, as far as the defense ministry is concerned, the data shows it goes more often to the senior party. Foreign affairs ministry, however, was more likely than defense to go to a different party than the one holding the prime minister office.

These findings open up the opportunity and need for further studies. Qualitative research, particularly interviews with former party leaders involved in coalition bargaining and former ministers may prove not just an useful but a central piece in understanding the preference for these two portfolios or the lack thereof, and how their salience might have evolved over time. An inquiry into

the thinking and reasoning of political leaders involved in negotiating these portfolios could establish whether and how the NATO and EU memberships impacted portfolio salience in relationship to foreign affairs and defense. The next step would be extending the inquiry to other former communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe and identify regional tendencies.

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Annex 1

Cabinet		Party	% cabinet	% coalition seats	Foreign Affairs Portfolio	Defense Portfolio
Văcăroiu 1	First party	PSD	91%	80%	x	x
	Second party	PUNR	9%	20%		
Ciorbea 1	First party	PNTCD	46%	40%		
	Second party	PD	21%	18%	x	x
Ciorbea 2	First party	PNTCD	48%	40%		
	Second party	PD	24%	24%	x	x
Ciorbea 3	First party	PNTCD	64%	51%		x
	Second party	PNL	23%	24%		
	Independent				x	
Vasile 1	First party	PNTCD	42%	39%		
	Second party	PD	33%	23%	x	x
Vasile 2	First party	PNTCD	42%	40%		
	Second party	PD	33%	24%	x	x
Isărescu 1	First party	PNTCD	44%	40%		
	Second party	PD	22%	23%	x	x
Isărescu 2	First party	PNTCD	47%	41%		
	Second party	PD	24%	24%	x	x
Năstase 1	First party	PDSR(PSD)	88%	90%	x	x
	Second party	PSDR	8%	6%		
Tăriceanu 1	First party	PNL	42%	42%	x	x
	Second party	PD	29%	30%		
Tăriceanu 2	First party	PNL	48%	48%	x	
	Second party	PD	33%	35%		x
Tăriceanu 3	First party	PNL	78%	73%	x	x
	Second party	UDMR	22%	30%		
Boc 1	First party	PDL	50%	51%		x
	Second party	PSD	50%	49%	x	
Boc 3	First party	PDL	67%	79%	x	
	Second party	UDMR	27%	15%		
	Third party	UNPR	7%	7%	x	x
Ungureanu	First party	PDL	60%	74%		
	Second party	UDMR	27%	14%		
	Third party	UNPR	13%	12%	x	x
Ponta 1	First party	PSD	47%	61%		
	Second party	PNL	47%	35%	x	x
Ponta 2	First party	PSD	52%	53%	x	x
	Second party	PNL	37%	38%		
Ponta 3	First party	PSD	78%	71%	x	x
	Second party	UDMR	9%	9%		
Ponta 4	First party	PSD	71%	72%		x
	Second party	ALDE	19%	18%		
	Independent				x	
Grindeanu	First party	PSD	85%	88%		x
	Second party	ALDE	15%	12%	x	
Tudose	First party	PSD	85%	88%		x
	Second party	ALDE	15%	12%	x	
Dăncilă 1	First party	PSD	85%	88%		x
	Second party	ALDE	15%	12%	x	

